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Remote operations
Integrated Operations
SenseworkThere is a general trend of more distributed work configurations in many work domains, examples being
air traffic management and telemedicine. As the offshore petroleum industry conquers increasingly
remote and harsh areas, there is a pressure towards lower offshore staffing and more sensor-based
onshore management. This introduces new challenges of control and safety. Integrated Operation (IO)
addresses many of the challenges associated with remoteness. IO denotes an operating philosophy where
new technologies and work processes make possible an increased use of real-time data and collaboration
across geographical distances and professional disciplines. It presupposes clearly defined work processes,
and a strong division of labour with respect to decision making and execution. In this article, interpreta-
tion work, decision making and execution are investigated through the lenses of sensework. Sensework
denotes sociotechnical work in safety–critical operations where groups of professionals try to put
together pieces of information to give meaning to familiar and unfamiliar situations. The division of
labour and the envisioned decision making processes of IO build on assumptions that are not necessarily
valid for distributed sensework in remote areas or modes. Sensework is characterised by close, iterative
interaction with nature through the use of sensor data and digital representations, implying that decisions
are problematic to make for experts that are not really engaged with the operational context. There is a
need for more research on and refinement of models for operating in remote areas or modes. In particular,
there is a need for harmonisation between technological solutions and organisational arrangements.
 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction and objective
Hazardous activities in harsh environments represent a double
challenge; not only does one have to manage the inherent risks
associated with the hazardous activity itself, but additional environ-
mental and operational conditions that may affect the operations in
known and unknown ways must also be managed. An example of
this is the expansion of petroleum operations to the high north
(Verhelst et al., 2010). In this situation, well-known risks connected
to drilling and production operations are reinforced and extended
by physical and operational conditions associated with geographic
(including geologic) and climatic (including hydrographic) circum-
stances, making necessary operation from a distance – a higher
degree of onshore management of offshore installations. While
physical conditions refer to environmental aspects such as temper-
ature, wind, ocean depth, pressure, remoteness and material wear,
operational conditions in this paper refer to challenges of remote-
ness, associated with division of labour and decision making hierar-
chies. The paper addresses some particular challenges of remoteness
and its operational and organizational consequences.Remoteness induces challenges with respect to staffing, infor-
mation management and organising of operations. Long distances
and significant travel risk and expenses are drivers for low staffing.
One way of compensating for this is to automate tasks that are cur-
rently being done by humans, in addition to reducing the organisa-
tional redundancy represented by arrangements where the same
tasks are allocated to more people than the minimum requirement
would suggest. While the primary objectives of the operations usu-
ally remain unaltered, such re-definitions of tasks and staffing
must be accompanied by a re-examination of the way tasks and
resources are being coordinated. In complex sociotechnical sys-
tems, humans are seldom replaced by systems and machines with-
out triggering the need for new kinds of work involving human
judgement, often at other locations such as control rooms, centres
of coordination and the like. To facilitate this, the division of labour
and even the foundational operating philosophy will also often
have to be established anew.
While remoteness may be considered as an extreme environ-
ment in itself, remoteness is always relative to how one chooses
to organise operations and locate different functions, hence it
may be more adequate to speak of remoteness as a response to
the harsh environment (infrastructural and environmental
conditions)..1016/j.
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high pressure and high temperature, and a notorious uncertainty
with respect to what kinds of formation and formation character-
istic the crew will drill into next, represent conditions that become
increasingly challenging as remoteness of operations increases. In
many respects, Integrated Operation (IO) is the petroleum indus-
try’s response to many of the challenges of harsh environments.
IO is an operating philosophy and an operating regime in the pet-
roleum industry involving aiming to develop the technological and
organisational capabilities to make better use of real-time data,
facilitating for work processes that rest on better and more radical
division of labour, sensor-based management and digitally enabled
integration across professional boundaries, geographical distances
and organisations. The main goal is to ensure faster, better and
safer operations. While IO has become the commonly used terms
for this process in Norway, similar developments elsewhere are
frequently referred to as field of the future, smart fields, iField, dig-
ital oil fields, e-field, intelligent energy and digital energy. The
body of research on IO and safety is young, but growing (e.g.
Albrechtsen and Besnard, 2013; Andersen et al., 2010;
Droivoldsmo et al., 2007; Grøtan et al., 2010; Haavik, 2013;
Hollnagel et al., 2010; Johnsen, 2012; Kaarstad and Rindahl,
2011; Rosendahl and Hepsø, 2013; Tveiten, 2014).
A traditional assumption in the petroleum industry that has
survived the transition into IO, is that operational decisions take
place at a certain stage of a linear process of monitoring, interpre-
tation, decision making and execution, and that division of labour
should reflect the stages in this process. Consequently, an envi-
sioned, ideally organising principle of IO is that interpretation work
and decision making should be allocated to the experts onshore,
while the offshore community merely shall execute the decisions
(Droivoldsmo et al., 2007).
The challenges experienced by the petroleum industry repre-
sent a case of a more general trend of distributed work in high-
risk domains. Interoperable global ATM systems (see e.g. Malakis
and Kontogiannis, 2014) and telemedicine (see e.g. Nicolini,
2007) are examples of other domains where remote operations
will be increasingly common in the near future. This paper inves-
tigates the unfolding of the interrelated work of interpretation,
decision making and execution in the domain of offshore oil and
gas exploration where harsh environment and remoteness of oper-
ations induce requirements for low offshore staffing and high
degree of sensor-based monitoring, combined with support and
management from remote centres of coordination. The analysis is
believed to also have generic value, hence the analysis could also
be read as an analysis of remote operations in general, although
particularities of the different domains are important to consider
in separate analyses.
To guide the investigations, the following questions are pur-
sued: (1) What characterises work where highly inaccessible, risky
phenomena are managed by a distributed organisation, and (2)
what does this imply for the decision structures and safe manage-
ment of future operations where sensor-based management,
remoteness and division of labour is envisioned to increase fur-
ther? The article contributes to the understanding of the chal-
lenges of and responses to remote operations, and the alignment
of the IO philosophy and approach with recent developments on
interdisciplinary, sociotechnical work in safety–critical operations,
under the label of sensework.
2. Sensework
The volumes of data – and the technologies to produce these
data, circulate them among an increasing number of potential
and actual users, and visualise them to make them communicative
and intelligible – have been rapidly growing in many workPlease cite this article in press as: Haavik, T.K. Remoteness and sensework
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oil and gas industry (Haavik, 2014b) and the health sector
(Haavik, 2016), who both have received much attention these
years as sociotechnical innovation has been sought through initia-
tives of Integrated Operations (IO) and telemedicine respectively.
Through the Norwegian based, but internationally oriented joint
industrial and research initiative Centre for Integrated Operations
in the Petroleum Industry, efforts have even been made to identify
and draw on commonalities between these domains in projects on
telemedicine for IO (Fernandes et al., 2014a, 2014b). With the rapid
and foundational sociotechnical developments, there is a need for
safety research to catch up and stay relevant also in the high-risk
high-tech domain. This development generates a need to scrutinise
the organising of work to align work practices with the changing
technological context.
Sensework has recently (Haavik, 2014b, 2016) been introduced
as a label for a type of sociotechnical work in safety–critical oper-
ations where groups of professionals work to configure heteroge-
neous information sources including digital sensor data and
different sorts of representations into coherent pictures that gives
meaning to familiar and unfamiliar situations. We shall return to
elaborate more on sensework after a brief review of some well-
established perspectives on decision-making and sensemaking in
the research literature that sensework relates to, but differs from.
Organisational structures of authority and decision making rep-
resent one central, long-lasting discourse in the safety field, with
the perspectives of Normal Accident Theory (NAT) (Perrow, 1984)
and High Reliability Organisation (HRO) (La Porte, 1996; La Porte
and Consolini, 1991; Weick, 1987; Weick and Roberts, 1993;
Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) and the prospects of the organisation
being able to spontaneously reconfigure from a centralised to a
decentralised decision structure during crises serving as central
references. Unfortunately the somewhat reductionist view that
NAT and HRO represent technology determinism (e.g. Hopkins,
2001) and social constructivism (e.g. Rochlin, 1999) respectively
has impeded a fruitful debate. A more serious elaboration on the
synergy between the perspectives could perhaps have led atten-
tion towards the heterogeneity of organisations and decision struc-
tures, where the social sphere and the technological sphere are
deeply interwoven.
Also the research agenda and approaches in the fields of deci-
sion making and sensemaking to account for and provide recom-
mendations for managing high-risk operations are required to
keep up scientifically with the rapid developments in the world
of practice. Although the research focus for decision making theory
to a large extent has shifted from a focus on rational choice (Simon,
1956) via bounded rationality (Cyert and March, 1963; March and
Simon, 1958; Simon, 1957) to organisational sensemaking (Weick,
1995, 2001), decision making in a resilience perspective (Woods,
2003) and naturalistic decision making (Klein et al., 1993;
Lipshitz et al., 2001; Zsambok and Klein, 2014), there is a strong
tendency to address work and safety from a cognitive perspective
– individual or social – without bringing the material and techno-
logical circumstances in as intrinsic elements of and context for a
more distributed cognition. While Weick (1995) and Weick et al.
(2005) criticises the use of the decision making term for often
referring to processes that really are interpretation work and
sensemaking, the lack of focus on the materiality and technology
associated with the generation, management and interpretation
of data is striking. Also Klein’s perspective on cognition as an indi-
vidual process that takes place in teams does not bring in the rich
sociotechnical heterogeneity of cognition that Hutchins (1995a,
1995b) has portrayed so well, into the discourse.
There is still a significant potential for more actively drawing on
methods and insights from fields outside the traditional safety
science domains that have invested much effort to explore howin harsh environments. Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Fig. 1. The tortuous trajectory of sensework.
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material and technological circumstances, and in a pragmatic
trade-off between formal structures and the need to get the work
done.
Sensework refers to both an empirical domain and an analytical
perspective associated with work and organisation in contexts of
increasing use of sensor data and representational technologies,
drawing on synergies between safety science and what we here
for short call work studies1 (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996; Heath
and Luff, 1992; Hutchins, 1995a, 1995b; Latour, 1987, 2005; Law,
2000; Law and Urry, 2004; Star and Strauss, 1999; Suchman, 1993,
1996). Sensework is related to sensemaking through the focus on
interpretative practices rather than decision making, but is different
from sensemaking with its focus on materiality, technology, models
and representations that enters into sensework. Central in this type
of work is the use and circulation of digital representations as a means
of communication, collaboration and coordination; as the object of
interest is inaccessible for direct inspection, interpretation work
and decision making is heavily dependent on different kinds of
sensor data that are transformed to figures, curves and graphs and
made subject to evaluation in centres of coordination, often far
away from the operations. The ability to transform all kinds of
physical phenomena into digital representations involves a potential
for a significant mobilisation of information – and ultimately of
operations – and the prospects of making oneself nearly indepen-
dent of location has perhaps never seemed more realistic.
However, there is always a risk of hubris when configuring
organisations and work processes on the drawing table. That the
constraints and opportunities associated with real world opera-
tions tend to require both articulation work (Haavik, 2010;
Star and Strauss, 1999; Strauss, 1985) and variability in work prac-
tices so that they are not always in accordance with formalised
prescriptions is well demonstrated (Haavik, 2014b; Hollnagel,
2009; Nathanael and Marmaras, 2008; Suchman, 2007). As an ana-
lytical perspective, sensework acknowledges both the heterogene-
ity of work and organisation with respect to resources and
strategies. A multiplicity of human and non-human actors brings
forward operations in a pragmatic manner, drawing on a range of
strategies and techniques to enable progress and safety under
variable conditions.
Investigations of sensework in offshore operations (Haavik,
2014b) and surgical operations (Haavik, 2016) suggest an under-
standing of sociotechnical work in high-risk, high-tech environ-
ments that shed new light on decision making. Tracing the
biography of decision involves following the work along tortuous,
unanticipated and non-linear trajectories revealing what decisions1 This term is used to summarily denote workplace studies, distributed cognition
and science and technology studies.
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expertise, causal-logical and pragmatic practices, and different
shades of model-based and case-based reasoning (see Fig. 1).
Representations and visualisations take a central place in such
work. Due to their mobility and immutability (Latour, 1986), they
may be circulated easily among greatly distributed actors enabling
imitation of co-localised work despite large geographical distances.
By tracing the biography of what are often called decisions, by
mapping the locations, techniques and tools that are involved,
one may find both arguments and a vocabulary to speak of the
decisional nature of actions, rather than decisions merely as
choices that guides future action.3. Method
This article results from extensive research in the petroleum
industry over several years (2008–2015), a period when IO has
enjoyed much attention and high priority in the industry. In this
period, more than sixty informants have been interviewed on
issues relating to IO and safety, and this material has been supple-
mented by weeks of observation studies. The points made in this
paper have grown gradually out of the rich material from these
studies. The case introduced later stems from one particular study,
but it represents a phenomenon permeating all the studies, and
serves as a case for a particular analysis with generic value.
The combination of interviews and observation studies is well
suited to shed light on both formal work processes – work as imag-
ined – and actual work practices – work as done; both central
aspects of work that mutually shape each others’ conditions and
relevance (Borys, 2009; Haavik, 2014b; Hollnagel et al., 2006;
Nathanael and Marmaras, 2006).2 By studying work practices in
detail as they proceed and by supplementing with interviews of
the involved actors, we may get a better understanding of the rela-
tion between the structural measures – such as division of labour
and standardised work processes – to meet operational challenges
and the adjustments and trade-offs necessary to overcome them in
practice.
While variations of this paper’s topic has been addressed in
numerous studies in the period reported (Haavik, 2010; e.g.
Haavik, 2011a, 2011b, 2014a, 2014b), the specific case in this paper
unfolded during a particular case study in an international oil and
gas company in 2012. The case study involved two researchers fol-
lowing an onshore based rig team’s work with an offshore drilling
operation over a period of three months. Rig teams are responsible
for the planning of drilling and well operations and for counselling
and follow-up during execution. During that case study, we
observed eight video conference operational meetings between
the onshore organisation and the rig. These meetings typically
lasted from 08:30 to 09:00, and served to inform all parties about
the status of the operations and issues that needed further follow
up. This arena offered a unique opportunity to gain insight into
how the operations were coordinated and carried through. Break-
downs in the planned course of action represent occasions on
which the black boxes of smooth operations are opened and the
sensework is most easily accessible for inspection. This is not
merely a theoretical assumption: such situations took place during
the fieldwork and they did indeed prove useful for understanding
the modus operandi of the drilling and well department.
The rig meetings – or morning meetings – represent a useful
arena for studying a rich variety of aspects of drilling operations.
They are regarded by the informants as the primary arena for col-
laboration between the onshore rig teams, the offshore drilling2 See also Suchman (1987) for a highly relevant elaboration on this subject outside
the field of safety science.
in harsh environments. Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Table 1
Roles and responsibilities of the informants that were interviewed.
Role Responsibility Number of
informants
Drilling engineer Plan and follow up drilling operations 2
Leading drilling
engineer
Assist and advise less-experienced
drilling engineers in the group
2
Leader drilling
engineers
Personnel responsibility for the drilling
engineers on two separate fields
1
Completion engineer Plan and follow up completion
operations
1
Drilling
superintendent
Leader of the onshore/offshore team for
a specific field
2
Drilling and well
manager
Leader of the drilling superintendents 1
Coordinator of
directional
drilling
Onshore representative of mud logging,
MWD and directional drilling services
1
Drilling mud
coordinator
Onshore representative of drilling mud
services
1
Health, safety and
environmental
engineer
Health, safety and environmental
aspects of the operations, follow up
reports on incidents
1
4 T.K. Haavik / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxxorganisation and many other actors such as the service companies’
onshore representatives and the operating company’s experts,
mainly located at the head office, such as the subsurface support
centre.
In addition, we interviewed twelve members of the onshore
drilling organisation. The majority of these were members of the
onshore rig team, while the rest had other positions in the onshore
drilling organisation (see Table 1 for an overview of informants).
Individual, open ended interview guides were prepared for each
interview, tailor made to match the role of each informant. Written
notes were taken during the interviews and the observation ses-
sions. When returning to the office after each interview and obser-
vation session, notes were immediately transcribed and written
out more extensively as the observations and discussions were still
fresh in memory. Ethical standards were ensured by (1) anonymis-
ing all information that may lead attention to particular individuals
or organisations, and (2) letting a selection of informants read and
comment on early drafts of the article to ensure that the case mate-
rial was correctly presented and that the informants were not
misinterpreted.
While the case was studied from the position of the onshore rig
team, the author has rich professional experience from the offshore
side as a former mud logging geologist, together with previous
research fieldwork experience from field visits to an onshore based
geo expert centre. This experience was invaluable for the in-depth
understanding of the case and the professional discussions, and to
understand the perspectives of the offshore rig crew and the
onshore based geo-expert that during the case study were only
studied through the video-conferences meetings.44. Representing geological formations: sensework in action
During a hectic night and day in the summer of 2012, the off-
shore and onshore drilling organisation involved in a drilling oper-
ation on the Norwegian Continental Shelf struggled with a
formation integrity test (FIT) prior to drilling a new section of a
well. The episode was observed from the location of the onshore
rig team (OnRT), who is responsible for the planning of drilling
operations and for continuous counselling and follow-up during
execution through daily video conferenced meetings with the off-
shore rig crew (OfRC). In addition to OnRT and OfRC, a third group
of onshore based geo-experts (OEx) located in another city played a
central role in the case, which unfolded as a negotiation process
between three parties (see Fig. 2).
OnRT is a team with members solely from the operating com-
pany. The drilling superintendent is the leader of the team. The team
consists of both drilling engineers and well engineers, the two main
disciplines in the drilling&well domain. In the regular follow-up
meetings with OnRT, those engineers who are working actively on
the actual well usually show up, in addition to anyone else who is
interested to listen in. OfRC consists of a mix of members belonging
to the operating company (drilling supervisor or ’company man’, and
sometimes a drilling engineer), the drilling contractor (typically tool-
pusher and driller) and different service companies (e.g. directional
driller, data engineer/mud logger, MWD3 engineer, etc.) OEx is gener-
ally organised to mirror OnRT, with members from the operating com-
pany. On a general basis, OnRT and OfRC are familiar with each other
as they are organised to work together on the same well projects. OEx
is not linked up to any particular field, but is a single centre covering
all the fields. In addition, it is a general view among the OEx members
that they are not being used as much as they wanted; their service is
only ‘on demand’, and they have to work hard to market themselves
towards OnRT.3 Measurement while drilling.
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few years ago and that has just recently been opened for opera-
tions. OnRT is therefore also a fairly young organisation, but sev-
eral of the key personnel have considerable experience from an
adjacent field with largely similar geological structures. The same
is the case for OfRC.
When we entered OnRT’s operations room an early Monday
morning, the FIT performed during the late evening and night
had already been a hot issue for many hours. This was also what
was being discussed by the other meeting participants who had
shown up early. The video conferences meeting, which included
OnRT and OfRC, in addition to a service company and the onshore
supply base, started at 08:30 sharp. As soon as the few minutes of
standard introduction and formalities had been concluded, the FIT
was brought up again as a main topic for the meeting.
An FIT is usually conducted by the offshore rig crew immedi-
ately after drilling through the casing shoe and into the new well
section. The purpose is to test the strength of the cement bond
around the casing shoe and the formation to make sure that the
hydraulic pressure regime from the circulating drilling mud during
drilling will not cause fracturing of the formations and loss of dril-
ling fluid.
The drilling fluid – or the mud column – is the primary barrier
against influx of formation fluids and gases into the well, with a
blowout as the worst case scenario. If the formations crack, the
mud column may flow into the formations with the result that
the primary barrier against influx is lost. Such situations of lost
well integrity are critical with respect to blowouts.
A standard FIT is performed as follows: With the well shut in,
drilling fluid is pumped slowly into the well while the pressure
is constantly monitored and plotted. Since wired drill pipe has
not yet become common technology, downhole sensors pressure
readings are transported to the surface monitoring systems
through acoustic pulses traveling through the mud column.4 The
pumping continues until a predetermined pressure reflecting the
planned hydraulic regime is reached. After stopping the mud pumps,
the pressure is monitored for several minutes. In general, stable
pressure indicates that the casing shoe and the formation will be
capable of containing drilling fluid with the current pressure duringThis has been a standard for decades. It limits the number of parameters that can
be monitored, and introduces a delay in parameter readings. Still, there is not a very
high demand for wired drill pipe in the drilling disciplines.
in harsh environments. Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Fig. 2. The drilling organisation (photomontage, illustration photos).
Fig. 3. Formation integrity test in theory and practice.
5 The drilling programme is a plan that has been written by OnRT and authorised
by a range of individuals at different levels in the organisation.
6 ‘‘Another bad interpretation” referred to the interpretation practice on the
neighbouring field. This was uttered as critique of the interpretation practice on the
neighbouring field as such, but as a general warning against relativistic interpretation
practices.
T.K. Haavik / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5drilling, while a dropping curve could indicate that drilling fluids will
be lost to the formation due to fracturing of cement or formations.
As the meeting progressed, it became clear to us that the pres-
sure plots from the formation test were not according to the norm.
Actually, the curve had been dropping after the pumps were
stopped, producing a shape that could indicate loss of drilling flu-
ids into the formation (see Fig. 3). The test had even been repeated
twice during the night and the early morning, with the same result.
OfRC had emailed the onshore drilling superintendent about this
issue during the late evening the day before, as well as early this
morning.
After the routine FIT, the offshore operations geologist had con-
tacted OEx. According to the well integrity specialists, the test
result was not satisfactory. This was not the opinion of OfRC, how-
ever. The observed FIT curve was more or less identical to the
expected shape of the FIT curve as presented in the drilling pro-
gramme. Also, the many previous FITs on an adjacent oil field
had shown a similar pattern. The cause of this pattern had never
been fully understood, but their experience suggested that this
was how the FITs looked like in this area. They had never experi-
enced any loss of drilling fluid, so the evaluation criteria had been
adapted to the local context, following a form of experience based
and case-based reasoning.Please cite this article in press as: Haavik, T.K. Remoteness and sensework
ssci.2016.03.020In the dialogue with OEx during the night, OfRC had referred to
both the drilling programme and to the neighbouring field. During
the meeting also OnRT expressed satisfaction with the FIT, refer-
ring to the drilling programme with the expected curve shape,
based on previous experiences:
‘‘I am disappointed that the FIT is not interpreted as OK. The curve
is in accordance with the template in the drilling programme.5 Also,
I have never actually seen a curve that flattens out completely (. . .).
The extra time we spent on this should be attributed to poor plan-
ning. We have already spent too much time on this issue. It should
have been discussed thoroughly in advance”
[Drilling superintendent, OnRT]
By referring to hydraulics and formation physics, text-books
and simulations, OEx produced interpretations with reference to
a different context than OfRC and OnRT. In other words, the experts
did not question the operational communities’ experience, nor the
consequence they drew from this experience to the case in ques-
tion, but they in effect introduced laboratories and laws of physics
as the more relevant context of reference for interpretation. They
also left no doubt regarding the responsibility for shouldering the
risk associated with the further operations. The message brought
on to the drilling superintendent was unambiguous:
‘‘The decision is yours, but you better be very sure on your interpre-
tation if you continue to drill. You can not justify one bad interpre-
tation with another bad interpretation6‘‘
[OEx]
Despite the drilling superintendent clearly expressing confi-
dence of interpretation, he did by no means take easy on the wor-
ries expressed by OEx. As he told us outside the formal meeting
arena, the clear message from OEx was a constant source of con-
cern and unease.in harsh environments. Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
6 T.K. Haavik / Safety Science xxx (2016) xxx–xxxStill, the case did not resemble a static disagreement. About
twenty-four hours went from the first FIT was taken to the case
was closed and the drilling organisation had settled with OnRT’s
decision, under the leadership of the drilling superintendent, to
keep on drilling. During this time, a number of arguments were
brought into the discussion by OfRC, OnRT and OEx. OfRC crew
and OnRT made extensive use of experiences from an analogous
field, and normal variability of well behaviour in the interpretation
of the FIT, while OEx’s interpretations referred largely to the speci-
fic tests in the specific well, the law of physics and a substantial
body of governing documentation.
In the final well report that we got access to months later, we
found no traces of these arguments. In this report, the drilling
operation had taken the shape of work as imagined; a linear, undis-
puted process more or less following the drilling programme. Ser-
ies of decisions linked together by executional work. Not a
completely untrue story, but not very rich, either.8 This may be read as a variation over the theme of requisite variety (Adamski and
Westrum, 2003; Ashby, 1956; Hollnagel, 1998).
9 what we were witness to was not a disagreement as such, but sensework that
used uncertainty as a vehicle to travel across a variety of references. Uncertainty is
often regarded as an obstacle for progress, but here uncertainty contributed to
richness of cognitive work.
10 One additional, important condition that has not been mentioned explicitly so far5. Discussion
During the twenty-four hours that went by before the FIT case
was settled, a range of resources was brought into play. The inter-
pretation of the test results involved both theoretical models of
strength calculations and empirical patterns of previous opera-
tions, or, more generally, it drew on both model-based reasoning
(see e.g. Rommetveit et al., 2008) and case-based reasoning (see
e.g. Raja et al., 2011). The onshore support staff have rich resources
in the form of expertise, software and time to make use of simula-
tions, calculations and relevant documentation to produce inter-
pretations that are coherent and consistent with the theories,
models and governing documentation which the drilling opera-
tions are expected to follow. The offshore crew, on the other hand,
has strengths in their closeness to the operations, their historical
experience from other wells, and their expertise on handling the
variability that is so characteristic of drilling operations.
Formally there is no doubt about who has the responsibility and
decision authority in the different phases of the operations. OnRT
are responsible for the planning of operations, and follow up con-
tinuously during drilling. OEx have an advisory function, and can-
not overrule any decisions made by OnRT. And actually, they are
not allowed to contact OfRC directly and take initiative to commu-
nication that bypasses OnRT. OfRC are obliged to follow the drilling
programme. However, drilling programmes are notoriously uncer-
tain and adaptations and alterations are frequent. Many of these
are handled by OfRC without involving OnRT. Our informants also
made it clear to us that although OnRT are formally in the position
to overrule OfRT, they are seldom disagreeing after having dis-
cussed. It is a general view that OfRT are well positioned to make
good interpretations, and after all, they are the ones who ’sit on
top of the hydrocarbons’ and are most exposed to immediate risk.7
With the FIT case in mind, we shall in the following discuss the
nature of decisions, how they relate to actions, and what this
means to the prospects for division of labour with respect to deci-
sion and execution in operational settings.
5.1. Decisions have a rich biography
The operational communities (OfRC and OnRT) and the theoret-
ical experts (OEx) work towards the same common goal of con-
stantly maintaining well integrity through all phases of the
drilling operation, and they are confronted with the same numbers
and curves stemming from the same well. However, they deploy
different sets of references in their interpretation work. The most7 In emergency situations, offshore also have the formal decision authority.
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ences from other historical or parallel drilling operations. While
previous FITs in the same and adjacent areas thus constitute cen-
tral references for OfRC and OnRT, OEx interpret the FIT mainly
with reference to virginal mathematical equations and written
procedures. Thus, the case could easily appear as a controversy
between different professional communities or teams and their
claims to truth.
However, drilling operations are performed by organisations,
and should be understood as organisational processes. Hence, the
outcome of organisational work should not be reduced to contro-
versies between different communities’ perspectives and whose
perspective won support. The point of departure should be the
organisation, or the sociotechnical system. Sociotechnical systems
are heterogeneous not only in the sense that their processes and
contents belong both to the social and the technological spheres,
but also in the sense that they have several references – case based
reasoning, theoretical models, operational experience, theoretical
expertise, procedures and histories, to mention a few – at their dis-
posal, echoing the distributed cognition elaborated on by Hutchins
(1995a). This is what is revealed when the black-box of everyday
operations is opened and investigated. The more heterogeneous,
the greater is the variety at their disposal in the face of an unpre-
dictable environment.8 In this perspective, what we were witness to
was not a disagreement as such, but sensework that used uncer-
tainty as a vehicle to travel across a variety of references.9 The out-
come of the process must be understood in light of the biography of
the decision – a collective journey across a variety of references.5.2. Right decision, wrong decision? Wrong question
In light of the above elaboration, we should not evaluate the
continued drilling as the right or wrong choice among alternatives;
OfRC’s and OnRT’s wish to keep on drilling, and OEx’s recommen-
dation to change mud parameters. We should acknowledge that
everyday operations unfold not as a series of distinct decisions
forming a linear trajectory of work. When we observe everyday
operations, they are winding roads that are shaped by many actors
and resources.10 Still, in the end – as in the final well report – they
tend to be presented summarily as a series of ’decisions’, thus
black-boxing so much of the rich sensework and pragmatics actually
constituting the everyday operations. Therefore, descriptions of
work as actually done are necessary to avoid the faulty ascrip-
tion of decisions to single actors. Work as actually done is also the
best source to understand how actions and decisions are
organisational achievements. It is also a central input to understand
why adjustments to standard procedures are sometimes necessary
to understand as efficiency-thoroughness trade-offs (ETTO)
(Hollnagel, 2009), while at other instances normalisation of deviance
(Vaughan, 1996) and practical drift (Snook, 2000) may represent
more accurate descriptions.
Where does this leave us? Do we not have any way of evaluat-
ing the operations normatively, in terms of safety? Instead of
agreeing or disagreeing with the decision that was made, and by
who, we could for example ask if there could be a potential to
expand the test repertoire and the distributed cognitive resources.is the pecuniary motive. Rig prices at the time could be as high as 600.000$/day,
which means that every delay costs the operating company dearly. This has been left
out of the discussion here.
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perhaps gain valuable information and potentially nuance the
positions of offshore and onshore by introducing other tests that
would expose other and perhaps less ambiguous properties of
the relation between the mud system and the geological forma-
tions.11 Or to involve other disciplines that may add new ways to
understand the problem complex. We are not in a position to suggest
what these tests might be, or which disciplines could provide rele-
vant perspectives, we may merely suggest that it may be better to
start searching for safety in other places than in the decision making
hierarchy.
5.3. Decisions are the acts of networks
To account for these winding biographies of decisions, decisions
must be understood as unfolding actions and not merely as a punc-
tuated consequences of and directions for action. If we instead of
trying to locate decisions – with the rationale only to re-locate deci-
sions in accordance with some envisioned division of labour
according to IO visions – seek to trace actions, we discover that
action is always dislocated. This term is borrowed from Latour
(2005), who has documented this phenomenon – dislocation of
action – extensively. When we seek to account for the FIT and
how it affects the drilling operation, we are sent on a laborious
journey: from the pressure readings offshore, through emails and
phones to the onshore rig team and the onshore expert centre,
we visit previous measurements on other wells, on other fields,
curves describing the pressures on those wells, we visit textbook
and spreadsheet calculations and theoretical curves at the expert
centre, second-call night duties are awakened to have their say,
and so, when the decision to drill ahead has been made, who can
be said to have made that decision? Through all the work that
has been done, it is reasonable to view decisions as a post-hoc label
to denote the multifaceted actions that has preceded and that will
follow that moment of labelling.
It is the networks that act, and in that sense it is the networks
that make decisions. Not individual actors. Linking the decisions
so closely to action as we do here to some degree protects them
from Weick’s (1995) and Weick’s et al. (2005) scepticism towards
decision making. It is when the industry aims at faster, better
and safer operations12 through decoupling decisions from action,
that it becomes problematic. And perhaps not so fast, good and safe
in the long run.
6. Implications for work process design in remote operations
IO in the petroleum industry represents an operating regime
where one seeks to make better use of real-time data and collabo-
rative work arrangements to increase the efficiency, quality and
safety of operations. One vision for this operating regime is that
decisions are to be made onshore, while the offshore organisation
merely shall execute these decisions. Although IO is an operating
philosophy that pervades the petroleum industry as a whole with-
out discriminating between co-localised and distributed opera-
tions, it is particularly relevant for the segment of operations
that are highly remote and that calls for technologies and organisa-
tional arrangements that addresses the challenges of remoteness.
As an operating regime, IO is in principal rigged to meet many
of the safety challenges associated with harsh environments and
the technologies and work processes designed to transcend the11 Instead of asking ‘‘are we doing things right”, ask ‘‘are we doing the right things”,
and obtain what Argyris (1976) calls double-loop learning.
12 Many readers will probably associate the faster, better, safer slogan with NASA’s
faster, better, cheaper slogan in the 90s, whose failure has been pointed to by Woods
(2006) and many others.
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intrinsic unavailability to direct inspection of, and information
about, the formations and reservoirs that the drill string pene-
trates, is largely compensated by more and improved sensors along
the drill string, and better methods for bringing the measured data
to the surface, such as wired drill pipe (Nybø et al., 2012).
While the information infrastructure of state-of-the-art IO is
highly developed and capable of providing all relevant actors –
irrespective of geographical and organisational location – with
the necessary information in a timely manner, the technological
and organisational arrangements are not always well harmonised.
One example is wired drill pipe which may bring much more data,
and of higher quality, from the wells, but one has yet to make
organisational arrangements to make use of such data. Thus, infor-
mation infrastructure is in constant risk of becoming a detached
artefact of limited relevance, rather than integral to the work.
As petroleum activities expand to increasingly hostile and
remote environments, the installations are envisioned to increas-
ingly rely on low onshore staffing and sensor-based, remote man-
agement. While IO obviously aims towards and is designed to meet
such a future, articulated e.g. through projects such as IO in the
High North (Verhelst et al., 2010), today’s IO in not so harsh envi-
ronments may be seen as a sort of research laboratory where IO
technologies and work processes can be tested and implementa-
tion processes can be studied.
Digital information infrastructures are marked by an inherent
ambivalence; by offering geographically distributed actors access
to – and the possibility to respond to – large amounts of real-
time data, they support the integration of distributed tasks, and
the construction of shared situation awareness, but at the same
time (and due to that) they reduce the significance of physical
co-location and thus invite further disintegration. This dual process
of disintegration and re-integration, in combination with higher
degree of sensor-based management, automation and standardisa-
tion, contributes to the unfortunate combination of higher interac-
tive complexity and tighter couplings (Perrow, 1984).
What difference does such an understanding make when off-
shore operations migrate towards more hostile and remote envi-
ronments? If IO requires standardised work processes where
interpretation, decision making and execution are made subject
to a division of labour between onshore and offshore, our under-
standing of decision making as sensework reveals a blind spot
and a potential threat to safety in the IO paradigm: decisions can-
not be detached from operations, they only make sense as long as
they are allowed to unfold within their highly intertwined relation
with interpretation work and execution. Thus, to ensure that the IO
organising principles of low offshore staffing merely executing the
decisions made by an increased number of experts onshore actu-
ally will produce optimal decisions, one must enable the dis-
tributed organisation to actually re-integrate in practice. That
means not only (1) connecting different locations through an infor-
mation infrastructure, but also (2) using these connections to imitate
co-location rather that allow for further disintegration. While the first
point is mostly a technological issue that may be easily resolved
given that there are sufficient resources available, the second point
is to some extent disregarded. There has been much focus on col-
laborative decision making in IO, but this has been mostly
addressed through bringing actors together in punctual video-
conferenced meetings. Insofar as this appears as a reasonable and
good strategy, it has serious limitations if those with operational
decision authority are most of the time decoupled from the ongo-
ing operations.
The preoccupation with formalised work processes is tangible
to IO. Theoretical expertise, causal-logical explanations and
model-based reasoning are conceived as main ingredients of
professional practices. This is reflected both in the formalin harsh environments. Safety Sci. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Formalised, insƟtuƟonalised Non-formalised, ad-hoc
Strategic: Logical problem solving PragmaƟc pracƟces and workarounds
CogniƟve: Model-based interpretaƟon Case-based reasoning
OrganisaƟonal: TheoreƟcal experƟse OperaƟonal experience
Fig. 4. Axes of sensework (Haavik, 2014b).
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tion and when discussed with the informants themselves; work
as imagined. However, by observing work as actually done we also
may identify several non-formalised practices that appear to be
inextricably associated with resilience. These fall into the cate-
gories of operational experience, case-based reasoning and prag-
matic practices and workarounds.
As the FIT case illustrates, the references for adequate decisions
are not only theoretical models that describe causal-logical rela-
tions. The operational, case-based references are also central ingre-
dients in pragmatic solving of operational puzzles. And in this
pragmatism lies also the acknowledgement that there is a always
some variability in both humans’ and system’s performances
(Hollnagel et al., 2006), as well as in nature, and richness of tools,
perspectives and theories is required (see Weick, 2007). Sensework
is not associated with a linear, sequential and split-up configura-
tion of work and decisions, but with configurations that take these
pragmatic and inextricably intertwined practices into account.
Sensework refers to the indissoluble elements of work that, if it
is to be made subject to new, distributed work processes, require
that those work processes are compatible with this nature of col-
laborative work. To ensure this, one needs to arrange the organisa-
tion of work so that the decisional trajectories may still travel
freely through the whole landscape of sensework, and not only
in those areas which belongs to the formalised domain.7. Conclusion
The safety challenges of high-risk, complex operations in
remote environments require that formalised work processes,
actual work practices and the theoretical understanding of the
relationship between them take organisational aspects of informa-
tion technology, and ways in which they may and may not affect
work, seriously. This paper elaborates on this requirement, and
brings forward sensework as a perspective and a method for
approaching the challenge.
Sensework refers to ways of conceptualising and analysing risk-
prone operations in remote areas, where highly inaccessible, risky
phenomena are managed by a distributed organisation, supported
by sophisticated sensor-based information processing and repre-
sentational technologies. The nature of such work invites careful
considerations of organisational configuration with respect to divi-
sion of labour, design of work processes and decision making phi-
losophy. The portrayal of operations where no single actor alone is
in a position to compile the amounts of fragmented information
into workable solutions that brings operations forward in a safe
manner, introduces serious challenges to traditional organisational
hierarchies in the migration into more harsh environments. If deci-
sions and operational trajectories are to be made and not simply
happen, a thorough understanding of the nature of such work is
needed. The sensework perspective represents an interim attempt
to develop understandings and descriptions that are adequate for
this kind of work and work conditions.
There are two important findings from the investigations of
sensework in general and drilling operations in particular so far:Please cite this article in press as: Haavik, T.K. Remoteness and sensework
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grated Operations implying clear and static decision making struc-
tures is problematic. Sensework is accomplished by a broad set of
approaches including the strategic, cognitive and organisational
axes described in Fig. 4 below, implying that decisions cannot be
made by experts that are not really engaged with the operational
context. This finding is slightly at odds with the industry philoso-
phy that stresses the importance of firm and static configurations
of roles and responsibilities, but is not at odds with the HRO and
NAT literature pointing out the need for decision makers that are
deeply involved with the operational context of highly complex
operations. Aspectual punctuation (Almklov et al., 2014) is a defin-
ing characteristic of sensor data, and the price of distance is that
some information is within reach, but very much is no longer
attainable (see e.g. Maslen, 2015). Decision makers that are not
familiar and engaged with the operational context operate at the
mercy of what creates the mobility of circulating references
(Latour, 1986); precise, but meagre information.
The second finding is that in operations in remote areas, where
low staffing and highly distributed collaboration is imperative due
to environmental and geographic conditions, technological and
organisational arrangements must be seen in conjunction with
each other. In order for more and better sensor data to be useful,
it is not enough with information infrastructures and information
processing tools ensuring that these data are processed and
represented by sophisticated technologies, and circulated to
dedicated experts responsible for interpretation and decision
making. The organisational structures and the work processes
need also be aligned with the challenges. Following the dynamics
of sensework, operational onshore experts and decision makers
should ideally be entangled with the operative personnel and the
operations the same way as the different axes of sensework are
entangled with each other; making sense of offshore drilling
operations is a dynamic and highly situated endeavour, and the
work necessary to re-integrate operations that have been
distributed due to environmental and geographic conditions
should not be underestimated.
There is a need for further research on changing operational
regimes when expanding offshore operations – and other types
of operations – to increasingly remote modes of operation. Inter-
pretation work, decision making and execution are analytical dis-
tinctions that are highly intertwined in real operations.
Intertwined, and sometimes inseparable, are also theory, experi-
ence and practice. The challenge is to develop operational regimes
that do not cultivate certain of these aspects in isolation from the
others – but that acknowledge the complex interplay between
them – and to align technological and organisational arrangements
so that they work together to support this interplay.Acknowledgements
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